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Property; commercial leases-assignments and subletting--
restrictions and remedies
Civil Code §§ 1995.300, 1995.310, 1995.320, 1995.330,
1995.340, 1997.010, 1997.020, 1997.030, 1997.040,
1997.050, 1997.210, 1997.220, 1997.230, 1997.240,
1997.250, 1997.260, 1997.270 (new); § 1951.4 (amended).
SB 256 (Beverly); 1991 STAT. Ch. 67
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Under existing law, when a tenant breaches a lease of real
property and abandons the property, the landlord may continue the
lease and enforce its provisions if certain conditions are met1 and
the tenant's right to possession is not terminated.' Existing law
provides that acts of maintenance, efforts to relet the property, and
the appointment of a receiver by the landlord do not constitute a
termination of the tenant's right to possession.3 In addition to these
provisions, Chapter 67 provides that withholding consent to, or
terminating an assignment or subletting, does not constitute a
termination of the tenant's right to possession, if it does not violate
the tenant's rights under the lease.4
Under existing law, when a tenant breaches a restriction on
transfer5 in a lease, the landlord may terminate the lease and
recover damages.6 Chapter 67 permits the landlord to terminate the
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951A(b)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 67) (requiring that the tenant
have a right to sublet or assign the lease, although the right may be subject to an express condition,
if reasonable, or may require the consent of the landlord if the lease expressly or impliedly prohibits
such consent from being unreasonably withheld). See also id. § 1951.4(a) (amended by Chapter 67)
(requiring that this remedy be specifically included in the written lease and specifying the language
that satisfies this requirement).
2. Id. § 1951A(b) (amended by Chapter 67).
3. Id. § 1951A(c) (amended by Chapter 67).
4. Id § 1951.4(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 67).
5. See id § 1995.020(c) (West Supp. 1991) (definition of a restriction on transfer).
6. Id § 1951.2 (West 1985). The landlord may recover unpaid rent for the period prior to
termination and an amount equal to the difference between the rent that would have been earned
between the time of termination and the time of the award, less any rental loss the lessee proves
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transfer without terminating the underlying lease.7 Chapter 67 also
clarifies existing law by specifically stating that the landlord, in
addition to any other remedies provided by law, has a right to
contract damages, a right to terminate the lease, or both, when a
tenant breaches a restriction on transfer.'
Under existing law, an assignee of a lease is liable for the
breach of any agreement in the lease which occurs during the
assignment,9 but the assignee is not liable for a breach occurring
before the assignment or after the assignee parts with the lease.'"
Chapter 67 clarifies existing law by providing that an assignee who
receives or makes a transfer in violation of the restriction on
transfer is jointly and severally liable with the original tenant for
the damages caused by the transfer itself."
Existing law concerning tenants' remedies for the landlord's
breach of a provision in the lease requiring the landlord's consent
to an assignment is unclear. 2 Chapter 67 clarifies existing law by
providing that if the landlord breaches an express or implied
condition not to unreasonably withhold consent to a transfer, the
tenant may seek contract damages, terminate the lease, or both.'
3
could reasonably have been avoided. Id. The landlord may also recover the amount of rent due for
the balance of the term, less any amount of rental loss the lessee proves could reasonably have been
avoided, so long as the lease provides for such damages or the landlord relets the property prior to
the time of the award. Id.
7. Id. § 1995.330(b) (enacted by Chapter 67). When the landlord terminates the transfer, the
subtenant or assignee is guilty of unlawful detainer and the landlord may use summary proceedings
to obtain possession from the assignee or sublessee without terminating the tenant's right to
possession. Id. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1159-1179 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (specifying the
provisions of the summary proceedings procedure for obtaining possession of real property).
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.310-1995.320 (enacted by Chapter 67).
9. Id. § 822 (West 1982).
10. Id. § 1466 (West 1982).
11. Id § 1995.300 (enacted by Chapter 67).
12. See Coskran, Restrictions on Assignments and Subleases: The Tribulations of Leasehold
Transfers 22 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 405, 506 (1989) (indicating that the lack of case law makes it unclear
whether a lease provision requiring the landlord's consent is a covenant, which would allow
contractual remedies for breach, or a condition, the breach of which would excuse the tenant from
obtaining the landlord's consent).
13. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1995.310 (enacted by Chapter 67).
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Existing case law appears not to follow the rule in Dumpor's
Case. 4 Chapter 67 clearly disposes of the rule by providing that
a restriction on transfer in a lease is valid, even if the landlord had
consented to an earlier transfer.1 5
Existing case law permits restrictions on use in real property
leases.' 6 Chapter 67 codifies existing case law by permitting non-
residential real property leases to contain restrictions on use 7 by
the tenant.'8 Chapter 67 specifically provides that restrictions on
use may absolutely prohibit a change in use,'9 establish that a
change in use is subject to an express standard or condition,2" or
14. The rule in Dumpor's case provides that after the landlord has consented to an assignment,
the lease clause prohibiting assignment without the landlord's consent is no longer enforceable as to
subsequent assignments. Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke 1 19b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B. 1578). See Kendis
v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 58, 265 P. 844, 850 (1928) (holding that an assignee was bound by the
lease provision requiring the landlord's consent to an assignment, even though the landlord had
already given the original tenant permission to assign the lease and where the lease specifically stated
that its covenants were binding on assigns). See also Boston Properties v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 134 Cal.
App. 3d 985, 994, 185 Cal. Rptr. 56, 61 (1982) (stating that the rule in Dumpor's case is not the law
in California). But see Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 680 n.7, 174
Cal. Rptr. 136, 142 n.7 (1981) (suggesting that the rule in Dnmpor's case might still be followed in
California). See generally Coskran, supra note 12, at 552 (discussing, in detail, the defmition,
development and current status of the Rule in Dumper's case).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.340(a) (enacted by Chapter 67). This section does not apply if
the lease expressly provides that the restriction on transfer is limited to the original tenant or if the
landlord expressly states in writing that the consent or waiver applies to a subsequent transfer. Id. §
1995.340(b) (enacted by Chapter 67).
16. See, e.g., Chandlerv. Hart, 161 Cal. 405, 413, 119 P. 516, (1911) (stating thatrestrictions
on use are valid if reasonable). See also Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App.
2d. 22, 25, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1967) (holding that a restriction on use is not invalid as a restraint on
alienation). See generally Coskran, supra note 12, at 538 (discussing the validity of use restrictions
in California).
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1997.020(c) (enacted by Chapter 67) (definition of a restriction on
use).
18. Id. § 1997.2 10(a) (enacted by Chapter 67). Under Chapter 67, absent an express restriction
on use in a lease, the tenant may make any reasonable use of the leased property. Id. § 1997.210(b)
(enacted by Chapter 67). Ambiguities in restrictions on use are to be construed in favor of
unrestricted use. Id. 1997.210(c) (enacted by Chapter 67). If the lease contains a valid restriction on
use, then the restricted use shall be taken into account when determining the amount of rental loss
that could reasonably have been avoided under section 1951.2, unless the tenant proves that, under
all the circumstances, enforcement of the restriction would be unreasonable. Id. § 1997.040(a)
(enacted by Chapter 67). The landlord's remedy under section 1951.4 is available notwithstanding
a restriction on use in the lease, unless the tenant proves that enforcement of the restriction would
be unreasonable, under all the circumstances. Id. § 1997.040(b) (enacted by Chapter 67).
19. Id. § 1997.230 (enacted by Chapter 67).
20. Id. § 1997.240 (enacted by Chapter 67).
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require the landlord's consent for a change in use,2 but if the
lease requires such consent and does not express a standard for
granting it, the landlord may not unreasonably withhold consent.22
BAM
Property; inside telephone wiring
Civil Code § 1941.4 (new); Public Utilities Code § 788
(new).
SB 841 (Rosenthal); 1991 STAT. Ch. 1001
Source: Public Utilities Commission
Support: California Public Utilities Commission; Toward
Utility Rate Normalization; Utilities Consumer Action
Network; Pacific Bell
Under existing law, the responsibilities of residential landlords
and tenants regarding the installation and maintenance of inside
telephone wiring are not regulated.' Chapter 1001 requires lessors
of residential buildings to be responsible for installing at least one
21. Id §§ 1997.250-1997 260 (enacted by Chapter 67).
22. Id. § 1997.260 (enacted by Chapter 67). In leases executed before January 1, 1992, the
landlord may arbitrarily withhold consent unless the lease specifies otherwise. Id § 1997.270 (enacted
by Chapter 67). The tenant has the burden of proving that the landlord unreasonably withheld
consent. Id. § 1997.260 (enacted by Chapter 67). The tenant may satisfy the burden of proof by
showing that the landlord failed to respond in writing, within a reasonable time, to the tenant's
written request for a statement of reasons for withholding consent. Id.
I. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1955 (West 1985) (stating the obligations of a lessor); § 1941.2
(West 1985) (listing the obligations of a tenant); CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 786 (West Supp. 1991)
(providing for a comprehensive set of regulations with respect to residential telephone services
listings, charges imposed by rules or regulations, public telephone service, and methods for
complying with these regulations). However, existing law does not expressly address the
responsibilities of residential landlords and tenants regarding the installation and maintenance of
telephone wiring. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 786 (West Supp. 1991).
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usable telephone jack, and to maintain the inside telephone
wiring.'
Existing law provides that every telephone corporation
operating within a service area must issue to every residential
subscriber, a listing of the residential telephone services it provides,
the rates or charges for those services, and the state or federal
regulatory agency or agencies responsible for regulating those
services.' Existing law further requires every telephone corporation
operating within a service area and providing public telephone
services to furnish each of its subscribers with a description of that
service and the telephone corporation's policies for providing that
service.4 Chapter 1001 expands existing law to require every
telephone corporation to annually notify residential customers in
the service area of the responsibilities of the customer and the
telephone corporation relating to the inside telephone wiring, the
telephone corporation's procedures and charges relating to
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.4 (enacted by Chapter 1001). Chapter 1001 further specifies that:
(1) The lessor must make sure that the inside wiring meets the standards of the National Electrical
Code as adopted by the Electronic Industry Association; (2) the lessor must make necessary repairs;
and (3) the lessor must not restrict or interfere with the telephone utility's access to its telephone
network facilities. kdi Chapter 1001 is apparently enacted in response to the following: (1) The
numerous problems resulting from the Federal Communications Commission's order to deregulate
telephone inside wiring installation and maintenance; and (2) California Public Utilities Commission
Decision No. 90-10-064 which stated that legislation should be passed which would clarify the
responsibilities of landlords and tenants. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 1001, see. 1, at - (enacting CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1941.4, CAL. PUB. UTLH. CODE § 787). See id (definition of inside telephone wiring); 38 C.
P. U. C., Decision 90-10-064, at 73 (1991) (resolving the definitions of demarcation points in order
to determine the responsibility for inside telephone wiring maintenance).
3. CAL PUB. UTiL. CODE § 786(a) (West Supp. 1991).
4. Id Existing law also provides that all revenues and expenses from installing and
maintaining inside wiring must be accounted for in determining rates for a telephone or telegraph
corporation. Id § 461.2 (West Supp. 1991). Cf In re Deregulation of the Installation and
Maintenance of Inside Wiring, 420 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Minn. 1988) (requiring Northwestern Bell
(NWB) to reduce its telephone rates upon fiding that those rates were unreasonable because of the
following: (1) NWB's rates to customers were based partially on the cost of installing and
maintaining inside wiring; (2) the FCC ordered deregulation of inside wiring; (3) NWB no longer
incurred the expense of installing and maintaining inside wiring after deregulation; (4) NWB would
receive double recovery if they were allowed to recover costs for inside wiring in its local service
charges and as a separate charge to customers; and (5) NWB did not provide sufficient proof that its
existing rates were reasonable).
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malfunctions in the telephone wiring, and a description of any
services offered by the telephone corporation.5
DKA
Property; involuntary transfer of funds
Probate Code § 15305.5 (new).
AB 534 (Umberg); 1991 STAT. Ch. 175
Existing law allows for the establishment of trusts' that impose
restraints on the ability of a beneficiary2 to transfer their interest
in that trust.3 Chapter 175 establishes an exemption for restitution
judgments4 against the beneficiary for damages resulting from
conduct in which the defendant was convicted of a felony.
5
JEK
5. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 788 (enacted by Chapter 1001). If the telephone corporation
offers any maintenance or repair services for inside telephone wiring, the corporation must include
in the notice a description of the types of services offered, plus the rates, charges, and conditions for
these services, and whether those services are offered by nonutility providers. i § 788(c) (enacted
by Chapter 1001).
1. See 60 CAL. JuR. 3D Trusts § 1 (1980) (definition of trusts).
2. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 24 (West 1991) (definition of beneficiary).
3. Id. § 15300 (West Supp. 1991). Such a trust is termed a spendthrift trust. Id. See Parseal
v. Parseal, 148 Cal. App. 1098, 1102, 196 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464 (1983) (holding that spendthrift trusts
are generally valid). California law has created exemptions for these trust restrictions, including
exemptions for support judgments. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15305(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1991)
(delineating exemptions from support judgements). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157
(1988) (stating that the interest of a beneficiary in a spendthrift trust can be reached for child or
spousal support, services for materials considered necessary for the beneficiary, governmental claims
and services or materials furnished to preserve the beneficiary's interest).
4. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15305.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 175) (definition of restitution
judgment).
5. Id. § 15305.5(b)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 175). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1988)
(definition of felony).
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Property; mobilehome parks
Civil Code § 798.88 (new)
SB 459 (Lockyer); 1991 STAT. Ch. 270
Support: California Mobilehome Parks Alliance
Under existing law, the management of a mobilehome park'
may evict or obtain injunctive relief against any tenant who
violates the reasonable rules of the mobilehome park.2 Upon clear
and convincing evidence of continuing or reoccurring violations,
Chapter 270 enables management to obtain an injunction
prohibiting the violation for three years.3
AF
Property; mobilehome parks--rental agreements and rent
control
Civil Code § 798.17 (amended).
SB 132 (Craven); 1991 STAT. Ch. 24
(Effective May 10, 1991)
Under prior law, a mobilehome park' could require a
prospective tenant,2 as a condition of tenancy, 3 to accept a rental
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.3 (West Supp. 1990) (definition of mobile home). See also id.
§ 798.2 fVest Supp. 1990) (definition of management), § 798.4 (definition of mobilehome park). See
generally B. HODES & G. G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES, cbs. 2, 4, 5 (3rd ed. 1974)
(discussing the authority to regulate mobilehome parks, state and municipality regulations, and
specific areas of regulation); SHEPARD'S MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS (1975 & Supp.
1991) (discussing the current state of mobilehome park law).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.56(d) (West Supp. 1991).
3. Id. § 798.88 (enacted by Chapter 270).
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.4 (West 1982) (definition of mobilehome park).
2. See id. § 798.9 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of homeowner). Under the Mobile Home
Residency Law, the definition of homeowner is synonymous with the prior definition of tenant. Cal.
Slat. ch. 1397, sec. 2 at 5320 (1982) (definition of tenant). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798-798.77
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agreement4 for a term longer than twelve months and which meets
other prescribed criteria5 for making the agreement exempt from
rent controls.' Under existing law, however, an existing tenant in
a mobilehome park has an option to reject such a rental agreement
and instead accept a rental agreement for twelve months or less
that is not exempt from local rent controls.7 Chapter 24 deletes the
distinction between existing and prospective tenants with respect to
rental agreements exempt from rent controlsY
KLS
Property; nuisance abatement actions
Health and Safety Code §§ 11573.5, 11581 (amended).
AB 666 (Lee); 1991 STAT. Ch. 247
Under existing law, any building used for the purposes of illegally
selling, storing or manufacturing controlled substances constitutes
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (codifying the Mobilehome Residency Law).
3. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.12 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of tenancy).
4. See id § 798.8 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of rental agreement).
5. Id § 798.17(b) (amended by Chapter 24). Rental agreements exempt from rent control
must: (1) Be in excess of 12 months' duration; (2) be entered into between the management and a
homeowner for the personal and actual residence of the homeowner, (3) allow the homeowner at least
30 days from the date the rental agreement is offered to accept or reject the rental agreement; and
(4) allow the homeowner who executes a rental agreement pursuant to this section to void the rental
agreement by notifying management within 72 hours. Id
6. Id § 798.17(a) (amended by Chapter 24) (noting exemptions from local rent control
measures).
7. Id § 798.17(c) (amended by Chapter 24). See generally Yee v. City of Escondido, 224
Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal.Rptr. 551, 557 (1990) (holding that the combined effect of the
mobile home rent control ordinance and the California Mobilehome Residency Law did not amount
to a compensable taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment and article I, section 19 of the
Califcrnia Constitution). But see Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th Cir. 1986)
(providing that the ordinance requiring mobile home operators to offer their tenants leases of
unlimited duration constituted a compensable taking of property where tenants could transfer their
leases without operators' approval, and rent increases were strictly limited).
8. CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.17(c) (amended by Chapter 24).
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a nuisance.' Existing law also provides that a private citizen, as
vell as a government agency, may institute a nuisance abatement
action against the person maintaining the nuisance, and/or the
owner or lessee of the building.2 Chapter 247 allows additional
remedies which may be recovered from the offending party in a
nuisance abatement action.3 Chapter 247 also enumerates factors
which the court must consider in determining the amount of any
fine levied on the defendant in an abatement action.4
BMW
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11570 (West Supp. 1991). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 370
(Vest 1988) (definition of nuisance). Butsee People v. Holland, 158 Cal. App. 2d 583,589, 322 P.2d
983, 987 (1958) (holding that evidence of a single, isolated instance of the sale of narcotics was not
sufficient to constitute "maintaining" a nuisance).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFm CODE § 11571 (West Supp. 1991). Any state citizen who is also
a resident of the county in which the alleged nuisance takes place may maintain an action to abate
such nuisance. Id. The district attorney of any county, or the city attorney of any incorporated city
may also bring the nuisance abatement action. Id. See id. § 11578 (West 1975) (providing that if a
nuisance abatement action is filed unreasonably, the costs of the action shall be paid by the person
bringing the action). See also i § 11571 (West Supp. 1991) (stating that a perpetual injunction to
prevent the nuisance is the typical remedy); § 11581(b)(2) (amended by Chapter247) (allowing fines
to be levied on the defendant); §§ 11583-11585 (West 1975) (providing that movable property as
well as the building itself may be sold to pay the costs of maintaining the injunction and the
plaintiff's costs). But see People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1, 9-10, 12 P.2d 941, 945 (1932) (holding that
a judicial determination is necessary before a statutory forfeiture may be executed).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11573.5(f) (amended by Chapter 247). In addition to
previous remedies, the court may order any of the following: (1) Capital improvements, such as
security gates; (2) improved exterior and interior lighting; (3) security guards; (4) posting of signs;
(5) owner membership in neighborhood or local merchants' associations; (6) attending property
management training programs; or (7) making cosmetic improvements to the property. Id.
4. Id. § 11581(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 247). The maximum fine which may be levied in
a nuisance abatement action is $25,000. Id. In determining the amount of any fine to be levied on
the defendant, the court shall consider- (1) Any actions taken by the defendant in the interest of
mitigating the nuisance, or the reasons why the offender took no action; (2) the cost to the
government of investigating and correcting the nuisance; (3) any previous nuisance actions against
the same defendant; and (4) any other factor the court deems relevant. Id.
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Property; real property--short-term hirings
Civil Code § 1940.1 (amended).
AB 537 (Friedman); 1991 STAT. Ch. 245
Under existing law, a person is prohibited from requiring an
occupant to move, or check out and re-register before the thirtieth
day of continuous occupancy if a purpose of doing so is to deny
the occupant the tenant protections applying to tenancies of greater
than 30 days.' Chapter 245 specifies that this provision applies
only to an occupant of a residential hotel.2
TD III
Property; rule against perpetuities
Civil Code §§ 715.2,715.3, 715.4,715.5, 715.6, 715.7, 716,
716.5, 1391.1 (repealed); § 715 (repealed and new); § 1391
(new); §§ 722, 724, 773, 885.010, 885.015, 885.070
(amended); Probate Code §§ 15211, 15212, 15413, 15414,
21200, 21201, 21202, 21205, 21207, 21208, 21209, 21210,
21211, 21212, 21220, 21225, 21230, 21231 (new).
AB 1577 (Sher); 1991 STAT. Ch. 156
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.1(a) (amended by Chapter 245). Under prior law, this section did
not apply to any person letting a dwelling unit to an occupant who: (1) Maintained transient
occupancy in a hotel, motel or other facility when that occupancy would be subject to tax under
Revenue and Taxation Code section 7280; or (2) maintained occupancy at a hotel or motel where the
innkeeper retained a right of access and control. 1990 Cal. Stats. cl. 1235, sec. 1, at 4482 (enacting
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1940.1(c)) (amended by Chapter 245). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1940-
1954.1 (,Vest 1985 & Supp. 1991) (providing tenants' rights and duties and landlords' rights and
duties).
2. CAl. CIV. CODE § 1940.1 (amended by Chapter 245). See also CAL. H4AiLThl & SAFET'
CODE § 50519(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (definition of residential hotel). Cf. OR. REV. STAT. §
90.110(4) (1989) (providing that transient occupancy in a hotel or motel is excluded from the
provisions governing landlords and tenants unless created in order to do so). Existing California law
provides that a violation of the provisions governing landlords and tenants is punishable by a civil
penalty of $500 and entitles the prevailing party to attorney's fees for an action brought pursuant to
Civil Code section 1940.1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.1(b) (amended by Chapter 245).
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Support: California Law Revision Commission; The Estate
Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section, State Bar of
California; Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate
Code; Probate Section, LA County Bar
Under existing law, the rule against perpetuities1 provides that
no interest is valid unless it must vest,2 or fail, no later than
twenty-one years after a life in being3 at the creation of the
interest.4 Under prior law, an additional 60-year period in gross
validated all interests in real or personal property that would have
vested, or failed, within 60 years after the creation of the interest,
regardless of whether it violated the rule against perpetuities.5
Moreover, existing law provides that, under the cy pres doctrine,
an interest which violates the rule against perpetuities must be
1. , See In re Estate of Steele, 124 Cal. 533,537,57 P. 564,565 (1899) (defining a perpetuity
as any limitation that might postpone the absolute power of alienation until a period of time in which
lives in being no longer exist); BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 1195 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of rule
against perpetuities).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1401 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of vest).
3. See Boyer, SuRvEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 159 (3d ed. 1981) (definition of lives in
being). The lives in being must not be so numerous or situated in a way that evidence of their deaths
would be unreasonably difficult to obtain. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, sec. 2, at 3442 (enacting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 715.2) (repealed by Chapter 156); PROB. CODE § 21230 (enacted by Chapter 156).
4. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, sec. 2, at 3442 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.2) (repealed by
Chapter 156); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205 (enacted by Chapter 156). See J. GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPEru1TIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942) (providing the classic statement of the common law rule
against perpetuities: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest."). See also Estate of Grove, 70 Cal. App. 3d 355,
361, 138 Cal. Rptr. 684, 687 (1977) (holding that if, at the time the interest is created, there exists
even a slight possibility that the interest may not vest within the perpetuity period, the rule has been
violated); United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of Land in Spartanburg County, South Carolina, 54 F.
Supp. 849, 850 (Dist. S.C. 1944) (holding that the vesting period of a future interest may be
postponed until 21 years and nine or 10 months, or the period of gestation after the lives in being);
Denney v. Teel, 688 P.2d 803, 808-09 (Okla. 1984) (finding that if the event, upon which the interest
is limited, does occur within the 21-year period of the rule, the interest shall be valid). See generally
BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 158 (3d ed. 1981) (explaining and analyzing the rule
against perpetuities). Recent criticism of the rule against perpetuities has led many states to adopt a
wait-and-see provision. l at 160; Fletcher, Rule of Discrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform Without
Waiting, 20 STAN. L. REv. 459,472-74 (1968) (suggesting a 100-year period in gross, and discussing
a wait-and-see period); Turrentine, The Suspension Rule and Other Statutory Restrictions on Trusts
and Future Interests in California, 9 HAST. L. J. 262, 263-65 (1958) (discussing the application of
the rule against perpetuities).




reformed to fall within the limits of that rule, if that reformation is
consistent with the creator's intent.' Chapter 156 adopts the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP)7 which
provides that an interest is valid if it satisfies either element of a
two-prong test.8 The first prong adopts a condition substantially
similar to the classic rule against perpetuities.9 The second prong
enacts a 90-year wait-and-see period,1" under which a non-vested
property interest will become valid by vesting, or terminating,
within 90-years after its creation. 1 Under the cy pres doctrine
6. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1455, sec. 4, at 3009 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5) (repealed by
Chapter 156); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21220 (enacted by Chapter 156). Under the cy pres doctrine, an
interest must be construed or reformed to avoid violating the rule against perpetuities if it is posible
to do so while remaining consistent with the creator's general intent. Taormina Theosophical
Community, Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964, 977, 190 Cal. Rptr. 38,46 (1983); In re Ghiglia's
Estate, 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 442-43, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827, 832-33 (1974).
7. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-21225 (enacted by Chapter 156) (detailing the provisions
of USRAP) [those provisions adopted by Chapter 156 wil hereinafter be referred to as the statutory
rule against perpetuities]. See also CAL PROB. CODE § 21202(a) (enacted by Chapter 156) (providing
that USRAP applies only to non-vested property interests and unexercised powers of appointment,
regardless of when they were created). See generally UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901-2-907 (West Supp.
1991) (detailing the provisions of USRLAP).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205 (enacted by Chapter 156).
9. Id. § 21205(a) (enacted by Chapter 156).
10. UNiF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 164, 168-69
(Supp. 1991) (stating that 90 years was selected as the duration for the wait-and-see doctrine based
on a study published in Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, 20 U. MIAMI INsT. ON EST. PLAN. CH. 7 (1986)). This study suggested
that the youngest measuring life is usually six years old, the remaining life expectancy of this six
year old is 69 years; hence adding this to the 21-one year tack-on period approximates the 90-year
waiting period. Id Moreover.
The adoption of a flat period of 90 years rather than the use of actual measuring lives is
an evolutionary step in the development and refinement of the wait-and-see doctrine. Far
from revolutionary, it is well within the tradition of that doctrine. The 90-year period
makes wait-and-see simple, fair, and workable. Aggregate dead-hand will not be increased
beyond that which is already possible by competent drafting under the Common-law Rule.
UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrEs, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 164, 169 (Supp. 1991)
(emphasis in original). Another reason the 90-year period was chosen as the wait-and-see period,
instead of measuring lives, is that measuring lives are difficult to describe in statutory language, and
difficult to identify and trace. Ild at 166-67. Hence, the statutory saving clause must be drafted so that
..on. size fits all.'" Id at 167. But see, Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities:
Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1032-33 (1987) (asserting that the finding of 90
years as an average of the length of time that would be produced by using actual measuring lives is
merely speculation, and that such an average is highly improbable).
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205(b) (enacted by Chapter 156). The Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities also applies to general powers of appointment subject to a condition precedent, non-
general powers of appointment, and/or general testamentary powers of appointment. Id §§ 21206,
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contained within Chapter 156, if it is determined after the 90-year
wait-and-see period that an interest violates USRAP, the court
21207 (enacted by Chapter 156). In determining whether an interest or power of appointment is valid,
the prospect that a child will be born to an individual after the individual's death shall be disregarded.
Ila § 21208 (enacted by Chapter 156). When a transfer is made to a spouse of an individual alive at
the beginning of the perpetuities period, the spouse will be deemed alive at the time the interest is
created. Id § 21231 (enacted by Chapter 156). See id § 21225 (enacted by Chapter 156) (listing
exceptions on the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities). Some commentators suggest that USRAP is
more desirable than the various statutory rules against perpetuities adopted by the several states. See
Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP., PROB., & TRuST L 569
(1986) (stating that USRAP is advantageous because it will preserve interests that are likely to vest
within the perpetuities period, rather than voiding them because of a remote possibility that they may
not vest within that period); UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINsT Pm'rTrurIs, Prefatory Note, 8A
U.L.A. 164, 160-61 (Supp. 1991) (noting that USRAP provides for a greater degree of certainty of
title because most interests will be valid for 90 years, and acts as a savings clause and therefore
prevents interests from becoming void due to errors in draftsmanship); Young, USRAP to the Rescue:
Taming the Rule Against Perpetuities, MAss. L. REv. 126, 130 (1988) (asserting that USRAP
simplifies the rule against perpetuities because it eliminates the need to identify the lives in being);
Proceedings of 1978 Annual Meeting, 55 A.L.I. 45, 249 (1978) (remarks of Professor Casner)
(indicating that USRAP will prevent costly litigation for parties seeking to determine the validity of
interests because under USRAP most interests cannot be invalidated until after 90 years). However,
there are also disadvantages to USRAP. See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 1050-54 (1987) (stating
that USRAP encourages lawyers to create trusts that will last for 90 years, thereby extending dead-
hand control beyond current practice); Id at 1049-50 (explaining that USRAP will create uncertainty
because the validity of the interests may not be known for 90 years); King & Meiklejohn, The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: wait-and-see for 90 years, 17 EsT. PLAN. 24, 29 (1990)
(professing that the savings clause will protect incompetent draftsmen and prolong interests that were
created in poorly drafted instruments); Fletcher, Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63
WASH. L. REv. 791, 837-38 (1988) (suggesting that the rule against perpetuities is not necessarily
simplified by USRAP because the common-law rule is retained; rather, its impact is merely
postponed for 90 years); Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 WAsH. L. REV.
23, 44-47 (1987) (asserting that USRAP usually provides for reformation only after 90 years, when
the creator's intent is hard to ascertain); ia at 33-38 (suggesting that USRAP is not needed because
under Washington's statutory rule against perpetuities, interests are rarely voided because of a
violation of that rule). See also infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of
USRAP). Laws similar to USRAP have been adopted in several other states. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490 - 45a-496 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (West Supp. 1991); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200 - 44-6-206 (Michie Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-
11 (West Supp. 1991); MACH. CoMt,. LAws §§ 554.51-554.78 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. §
501A.01-501A.04,501A.06 (West 1990), § 501A.05 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-1-
802 - 70-1-806 (1990); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-2001 - 76-2008 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
111.1031 (Michie 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.950 - 105.975 (1990); S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10
- 27-6-80 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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must, upon petition by an interested person,12 reform a disposition
so that it falls within the applicable 90-year period. 3
Under the existing common law doctrine of separability, an
interest which is subject to alternative contingencies is treated as
though two interests were created in the same beneficiary.' 4 Also,
case law suggests that gifts which are made conditional upon the
occurrence of the latter of two events are within the separability
doctrine. 5 Although Chapter 156 does not expressly supersede
this principle, 16 it specifies that an interest which seeks to affect
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 48 (West 1991) (definition of interested person).
13. Id. § 21220 (enacted by Chapter 156). This right to reform the disposition arises only
when necessary to save an interest. Recommendation Relating to Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, 20 CAL. L. REv. COMM'N REPORTS 2501, 2514 (1990) (hereinafter Recommendation).
Typically, an interest which violates the common law rule against perpetuities is not in need of
reformation until the 90-year period expires. Id. Nevertheless, under USRAP, resort to the cy pres
rule should be unlikely because the 90-year period should solve most problems before reformation
would be necessary. Id. at 2515. Additionally, reformation may occur before the 90-year period
expires in the unlikely case where an interest can vest beyond the 90-year period but not before it.
Id at. 2514. Professor Dukeninier of the of UCLA Law School criticizes USRAP by asserting that
because a court has no jurisdiction to reform an instrument until 90 years pass, the validity of future
interests may remain uncertain for 90 years, whereas under prior law a California court could reform
an instrument immediately, thereby creating certainty about the validity of future interests. Letter
from Professor Dukeminier to the Honorable Phillip Isenberg, Chairman, Assembly Judiciary
Committee at 3 (April 5, 1991) (criticizing USRAP) (Copy on file at Pacific LaivJournao. Professor
Dukeminier states that in some cases it may be essential to know whether a future interest is valid
prior to the expiration of 90 years. Id at 4.
14. See Recommendation, supra note 13 at 2577. Under this doctrine the invalidity of one
interest does not cause the other interest to be invalid. Id For instance, if a gift is given either upon
a contingency that must occur, if at all, within the perpetuities period, or upon a contingency that
might not occur within this period, the gift is valid if the first contingency occurs even though it
would be invalid under the second contingency. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 376 (1944); Casner,
6 AmRICAN LAW Op PROPERTY § 24.54 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
15. See Earle v. International Paper Co., 429 S.2d 989,997 (Ala. 1983) (Jones, J. concurring)
(providing that if a testator conveys a gift which is conditional upon either of two expressed
contingencies, one which violates the rule against perpetuities and one that does not, the gift will take
effect if the valid contingency occurs); First Portland National Bank v. Rodrique, 157 Me. 277,295-
96, 172 A.2d 107, 116-17 (1961) (holding valid a testator's will upon finding that one of two
alternative contingencies in the will did not violate the state statutory rule against perpetuities, even
though the other contingency did violate the rule).
16. See Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2545 (asserting that the invocation of the
separability doctrine will usually result in one of the interests being validated by the classic rule
against perpetuities, and the validity of the other interest being governed by the 90-year wait-and-see
period).
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vesting beyond 21 years after the death of the survivor of the
specified lives is inoperative. 7
Under prior law, a trust could be valid even if its duration
exceeded an applicable perpetuities period," as long as all of the
beneficiaries' interests vested, if at all, within one of those
periods.19 Prior law also provided that if the trust remained in
existence beyond the perpetuities period, the trust could be
terminated upon the request of a majority of the beneficiaries, or
by the court under specified conditions.20 Chapter 156 instead
mandates that a trust for a non-charitable corporation or
unincorporated society, or a trust for a lawful non-charitable
purpose can be performed for only twenty-one years. Chapter
17. CAL PROB. CODE § 21209 (enacted by Chapter 156). For example, Chapter 156
transforms a gift made conditional upon the latter of 90 years, or specified lives in being plus 21
years, into a traditional perpetuities savings clause. See Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2576. By
making the 90-year period in a later of two events clauses inoperative, section 21209 prevents 90
years from becoming a minimum. L
18. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing the applicable perpetuities period
prior to the enactment of Chapter 156).
19. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 820, sec. 1, at 2728 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 716.5) (repealed by
Chapter 156). Cf. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1240, sec. 1, at 3317 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.4)
(repealed by Chapter 156) (providing that all trusts created for the purpose of providing insurance
to the beneficiaries are exempt from the rule against perpetuities). See also BOYER, supra note 3, at
159 (providing that a perpetual trust for charity is valid, but this is not necessarily an exception to
the rule against perpetuities since the rule concerns the remoteness of vesting and not the duration
of interests; however, an exception exists when the gift is from one charity to another on a condition
precedent).
20. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 820, sec. 1, at 2728 (enacting CAL. CirV. CODE § 716.5) (repealed by
Chapter 156). See Dukeminier, Is Exemption of Trusts from the Rule Against Perpetuities in Accord
with Sound Policy?, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 678, 686-87 (1967) (criticizing this rule, suggesting it is
similar to that of the wait-and-see statutes enacted in several states, and asserting constructional
problems of the statute such as its failure to specify who the beneficiaries are, how the majority is
to be ascertained, and to whom the trust property is to be distributed when the trust terminates). See
also id. at 691 (suggesting that the policy against perpetuities might not be satisfied, unless it is
certain that a trust will be terminated after the perpetuity period has run).
21. CAL PROB. CODE § 15211 (enacted by Chapter 156). These types of trusts will be valid
for only 21 years, regardless of whether there is a beneficiary who can enforce or terminate the trust,
or the terms of the trust contemplate a longer time. Id See Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2518
(noting that trusts for a non-charitable corporation or unincorporated society or for a lawful non-
charitable purpose are called honorary trusts). The apparent intent for imposing this 2 1-year limit on
honorary trusts, which are rare, is to avoid the possibility that such trusts could exist for 90 years
under the wait-and-see period of USRAP before termination. Id
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156 also provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic
or pet animal can be performed only for the life of the animal.22
Under existing law, the rule against perpetuities applies to
leases.23 Chapter 156 now requires that a lease commencing either
at a time certain or upon the happening of a future event will be
valid only if the term is to commence in possession within thirty
years from the date the interest was created.24
COMMENT
The California statutory rule against perpetuities was enacted
to avoid unreasonable suspensions of the power of alienation by
voiding interests which are not certain to vest within its period.2
A significant goal of this rule was to mediate between persons who
wanted to regulate the disposition of their property years after
death and those persons in future generations who wanted to
control the property "free of the dead hand.",2 6 To obtain this
goal, common law adopted the rule measuring the perpetuities
period by the lives of individuals in being at the creation of the
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (enacted by Chapter 156). See id. § 15413 (enacted by Chapter
156) (providing that any provision in a trust indicating that the trust may not be terminated shall not
be valid if it would cause the trust to be applicable beyond the period of the statutory rule against
perpetuities); § 15414 (enacted by Chapter 156) (providing that any trust which continues after the
statutory rule against perpetuities expires may be terminated upon petition of certain persons). See
also In re McNeill's Estate, 230 Cal. App. 2d 449, 454, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142 (1964) (holding that
a trust created for the care of the testator's pets was invalid, but the remainder following the invalid
trust was to be given effect). Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (enacted by Chapter 156)
(providing that a trust for a domestic or pet animal can be performed for the life of the animal) with
id. § 15211 (providing that honorary trusts can only be performed for a period of 21 years). Thus,
if a domesticated pet has a life expectancy of greater than 21 years, the trust for that pet can operate
longer than an honorary trust.
23. See Wong v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 535-38, 386 P.2d 817, 824-26, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241,
248-50 (1963) (holding that a 10-year lease to commence upon completion of a building did not
violate the rule against perpetuities because of defendant's obligation to complete the building within
a reasonable time, which is less than 21 years).
24. CAL- CIV. CODE § 715 (enacted by Chapter 156).
25. Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuidies, 37 CAiF. L. REV. 1, 9
(1949). See Lyons v. Bradley, 168 Ala. 505, 53 S. 244, 246 (1910) (providing that the purpose of
the rule against perpetuities is to favor the circulation of property by prohibiting the right of
alienation from being tied up or restrained beyond a specified period of time).
26. See Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2511.
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interests plus 21 years. 27 By extending dead hand control through
the 90-year wait-and-see period,28 USRAP has been criticized as
defeating the public policy notion that it is socially desirable for
living persons to control the wealth of the world, not the dead.29
One of the justifications for the 90-year wait-and-see period is
that it, in effect, provides for a savings clause.3" However, another
criticism of USRAP is that the 90-year wait-and-see period may
place the validity of property interests in abeyance for too long a
period of time.3' Nevertheless, the USRAP drafters claim that this
argument is false because the wait-and-see element is applied only
to interests that would be invalid without a wait-and-see period.32
27. See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 1053 (asserting that the common law is based on the
notion that the testator should control only for the lives of persons he knows).
28. See il. at 1051-54 (detailing how the wait-and-see doctrine extends the period of dead
hand control).
29. Id. at 1029-34. But see UNw. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PmRPTurrTIEs, Prefatory Note,
8A U.L.A. at 164, 166 (Supp. 1991) (indicating that dead hand control will not be increased beyond
that which is permissible under existing law by competent drafting). See generally, Simes, Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REv. 179, 188 (1953)
(criticizing wait-and-see rules).
30. UNir. STATuTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETJITIES, Prefatory Note, SA U.L.A. 164, 166
(Supp. 1991). A saving clause typically provides that if a trust has not terminated under the
dispositive provisions, it will terminate at the end of the perpetuities period. Dukeminier, supra note
10, at 1028-29. Hence the validity of all interests in the trust will be guaranteed. Id See generally,
Becker, Estate Planning and the Reality of Perpetuities Problems Today: Reliance Upon Statutory
Reform and Saving Clauses Is Not Enough, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 378-416 (1986) (discussing the
components, risks, advantages, and inadequacies of saving clauses); McGovern, Perpetuities Pi[falls
and How Best To Avoid Them, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 155, 175-77 (1971) (suggesting the
use of saving clauses as a means of avoiding the pitfalls of perpetuities). The drafters of USRAP
assert that the perpetuity-period component of a saving clause is, in effect, a wait-and-see rule. UNIF.
STATUTORY RULE AGAINsT PERPETUrmEs, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 164, 166 (Supp. 1991).
Therefore, the wait-and-see rule provides for a saving clause in all dispositions that, had they been
competently drafted at common law, would have included a saving clause from the beginning. Id.
However, Professor Dukeminier argues that these two doctrines are not analogous because a statutory
wait-and-see provision does not guarantee the validity of contingent interests; rather it provides only
an opportunity for potentially invalid contingent interests to prove themselves valid. Dukeminier,
supra note 10, at 1029.
31. UNiF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETTIES, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 164, 165
(Supp. 1991); Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 1023-1028. A period which approximates a century has
been called an unconscionable length of time. 6 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 52 (A.
Casner ed. 1952).
32. UNIt. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPErUITIFs, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 164, 165
(Supp. 1991). Under USRAP, in order to vest, all other contingencies must still be satisfied; simply,
they now must be satisfied within a designated time. I1 The drafters of USRAP urge that since this
additional waiting period is easily determined under USRAP, the additional contingency does not
cause any greater unertainty in the state of the tide than if this contingency were expressed in a
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Under existing law, the federal generation-skipping transfer
(GST) tax imposes a tax on transfers to a transferee, or skip
person, who is at least two generations younger than the
transferor.33 However, Congress created specified exemptions to
this tax.34 Now, scholars such as Professor Dukeminier of UCLA
Law School, purport that USRAP will create problems in regard to
the generation-skipping transfer tax.35
USRAP applies to non-vested property interests and unexercised
powers of appointment regardless of whether they were created
before or after the effective date of Chapter 156, which is January
1, 1992.36 This means that USRAP is retroactive, and certain
trusts which are measured by a latter of two events test 37 may
retroactively be declared partially invalid. 3' However, as a general
rule there should be no need for non-vested interests to seek
reformation because the 90-year wait-and-see period affords these
saving clause in the governing instrument. Id
33. I.R.C. § 2601-2662 (1982).
34. Il Irrevocable trusts created before September 26, 1985, are generally excepted from the
GST tax. TEIMP. TREAS. REG. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (1988). Also, after 1986, every person has a $1
millicn exemption from GST taxes for as long as the local perpetuities period allows. I.R.C. §
2631(a) (1988).
35. See Bloom & Dukeminier, Perpetuities Reformers Beware: The USRAP Tax Trap, 25
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 203, 204-11 (1990) (detailing the problems that USRAP will create by
extending the perpetuities period for a duration longer than the common law period).
36. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21202(a) (enacted by Chapter 156).
37. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing the later of two events test).
38. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21209 (enacted by Chapter 156). See Letter from Professor
Dukeminier to the Honorable Phillip Isenberg, Chairman, Assembly Judiciary Committee (April 5,
1991) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) at 21-22 (discussing the retroactive effect of USRAP).
An example of the problems this retroactivity may create is displayed in the following hypothetical
case:
0, owner of a building, rents it for 40 years. In order to have one landlord for the
duration of the lease, to prevent a "change of ownership (and property tax reappraisal)
under Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 61, and to prevent vesting of the landlord's reversion in
a minor, 0 transfers her landlord's reversion in trust to pay the income to 0 and her
children for (A) O's life plus 21 years or (B) 40 years, whichever is longer, when the trust
is to terminate.
Id. at 19. This arrangement will not be given effect under USRAP. Id Rather, the prong (B) clause
will be stricken retroactively by section 22109. Id. at 22. Cf Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2519
n.39 (mandating that a savings clause, which attempts to suspend vesting until the later of (1) 90
years or (2) 21 years after specified, is ineffective).
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39. Recommendation, supra note 13, at 2519.
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Property; seismic safety disclosures
Government Code §§ 8897, 8897.1, 8897.2, 8897.3, 8897.4,
8897.5 (new).
AB 200 (Cortese); 1991 STAT. Ch. 699
Under existing law, the seller of a private home must provide the
buyer with a copy of the Earthquake Preparedness Guide (Guide).'
Chapter 699 requires a home seller to disclose the structural
deficiencies in the home which make it vulnerable in the event of
an earthquake,2 and deliver both the disclosure report and the
Guide to the buyer.
3
AS
1. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10149(a) (West Supp. 1991). The guide includes: (1)
Infonnation on geologic and seismic hazard conditions; (2) explanations of the related structural and
nonstructural hazards; (3) recommendations for mitigation of earthquake hazards; and (4) a statement
that there are no guarantees of safety or damage prevention that can be made with respect to a major
earthquake and that only precautions can be taken to reduce the risk of earthquake damage. hi. §
10149(d) (West Supp. 1991). See Review of Selected 1990 Legislation, 22 PAc. L. J. 323, 686 (1991)
(discussing the enactment of California Business and Professional Code section 10149).
2. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8897.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 699) (specifying the
structural deficiencies which the transferor must disclose to the buyer); § 8897.3 (enacted by Chapter
699) (providing that a dwelling is in compliance if it meets the requirements for anchor bolts, cripple
wall bracing, and water heater bracing, anchoring or strapping); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
19210-19217 (West Supp. 1991) (listing regulations concerning the strapping or bracing of water
heaters to prevent fires and gas leaks after an earthquake).
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8897.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 699). Existing law regulating the
delivery of the Guide deems that this delivery is sufficient disclosure on the part of the seller
regarding possible earthquake hazards. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2079.8 (West Supp. 1991). The seller's
additional duty is to disclose any material structural deficiencies and any corrective measures of
which the transferor has actual knowledge. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 8897.1(a), 8897.2 (enacted by
Chapter 699). The seller's failure to prepare the disclosure will not affect the transfer of title. Id. §
8897.4 (enacted by Chapter 699). A real estate licensee's only responsibility under Chapter 699 is
to provide the Guide to the seller for delivery to the transferee. Id. § 8897.5 (enacted by Chapter
699). The Legislature's apparent goal in enacting Chapter 699 is to minimize the threat of gas leaks,
fires, and explosions during major earthquakes, and to alert a buyer to possible earthquake hazards
in a nswly purchased home. IML § 8897 (enacted by Chapter 699).
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Property; subdivisions--preliminary soils reports
Government Code § 66491 (amended).
SB 440 (Green); 1991 STAT. Ch. 668
Under existing law, the Subdivision Map Act' authorizes local
agencies2 to adopt local ordinances3 to regulate and control
subdivisions,4 including requiring a preliminary soils report for
every subdivision for which a final map is required and which may
be required by local ordinance for other subdivisions.5 Existing
law also authorizes local ordinances to require a soils investigation
of every lot in a subdivision if the preliminary soils report shows
the presence of critically expansive soils6 or other soils problems
which could lead to structural defects if not corrected.' Chapter
1. See CAL- GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). See Simae Design,
Inc. v. Alciati, 92 Cal. App. 3d 146, 157-58, 154 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1979) (finding that the main
purposes of the Subdivision Map Act are to facilitate orderly community development and to protect
consumers from exploitation). See generally Comment, Land Development and the Environment: The
Subdivision Map Act, 5 PAC. L. J. 55, 61-80 (1974) (discussing the Subdivision Map Act and
comparing the Act with the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66420 (West 1983) (definition of local agency).
3. See id § 66421 (West 1983) (definition of local ordinance).
4. See id. § 66411 (West Supp. 1991) (providing for local control of subdivision design and
improvement). See generally Note, Pines v. City of Santa Monica: Redefining the focus of
California's Subdivision Map Act, 16 LoY. L. A. L. REV. 61, 63 (1983) (asserting that the
Subdivision Map Act authorizes local governments to require developers to fulfill certain
requirements for designing and improving their developments as a condition to approving the
subdivision map); 63 Op. Atty. Gen. 601 (1980) (stating that the Subdivision Map Act delegates to
cities and counties the authority to regulate the particulars of the proposed subdivisions). See also
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66424 (West 1983) (definition of subdivision).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66490 (West 1983).
6. Critically expansive soils are considered to be coercive soils which contain high levels of
salt. Telephone interview with Melissa Garner, Legislative Consultant for Senator Cecil Green's
Office (Aug. 13, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66491(c) (amended by Chapter 668). A local ordinance may waive
the preliminary soils report if the local agency determines that, based on its knowledge of the quality
of the soils in the subdivision, no preliminary analysis is needed. Id. § 6649 l(a) (amended by Chapter
668). The soils investigation must be conducted by a civil engineer registered in California, and the
engineer must recommend the corrective action that is likely to prevent structural damage to each
structure to be constructed. Id § 6649 1(e) (amended by Chapter 668). The local agency may approve
the subdivision in which the soil problems exist if it finds that the recommended action is likely to
prevent structural damage to each structure to be constructed, and that the local agency may, as a
condition to the issuance of any building permit, require that the approved recommended action be
incorporated in the construction of each structure. Ica § 66491(f) (amended by Chapter 668). The
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668 expands existing law to additionally authorize local ordinances
to require a soils investigation of every lot in a subdivision which
may be affected if the preliminary soils report indicates the
presence of rocks or liquids which contain deleterious chemicals
that could cause construction materials such as concrete, steel, and
ductile or cast iron to corrode or deteriorate.'
DKA
Property; surface mining--financial assurances
Public Resources Code §§ 2207, 2714, 2770, 2773.1, 2774,
2774.4 (amended).
AB 1506 (Sher); 1991 STAT.Ch. 845
Existing law prohibits any person' from conducting surface
mining operations' unless a permit3 has been obtained from, and
a reclamation plan4 and financial assurances5 for reclamation have
preliminary soils report may be submitted to the city engineer or county engineer for review, and the
engineer may require more information or reject the report if it is found to be incomplete, inaccurate,
or unsatisfactory. L § 66491(b) (amended by Chapter 668).
3. 1d. § 66491(d) (amended by Chapter 668).
1. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2004 (West 1984) (definition of person).
2. See icL § 2735 (West 1984) (definition of surface mining operations).
3. See id. § 2727.1 (West Supp. 1991) (defining permit to include authorization from a lead
agency to conduct surface mining operations).
4. See id. § 2772 (West 1984) (detailing the form and content requirements of the
reclamation plan). See also id. § 2733 (West 1984) (defiming reclamation to include processes that
minimize the adverse effects from surface mining).
5. See id. § 2773.1(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 845). Under existing law, fmancial assurances
include surety bonds, trust funds, and irrevocable letters of credit which the lead agency determines
are adequate to perform reclamation in accordance with the approved reclamation plan. Id. The
amount of financial assurances must be adjusted annually and made payable to the State Geologist
and the lead agency. Id. § 2773.1(a)(1)-(4) (amended by Chapter 845). Existing law authorizes the
State Mining and Geology Board to adopt regulations specifying other financial assurance
mechanisms which are reasonably available and adequate to insure reclamation, but such mechanisms
may not include financial tests. Id. § 2773.1(e) (amended by Chapter 845).
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been submitted to and approved by, the lead agency6 for the
operation.' Chapter 845 requires existing financial assurances to
remain in force and prohibits the lead agency from releasing them
when a mine is sold or transferred until new financial assurances
have been secured from the new owner and approved by the lead
agency.8
Under existing law, certain activities are exempt from the
provisions of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975
(SMARA).9  Chapter 845 additionally exempts the solar
evaporation of sea water or bay water for the production of salt and
related minerals.' 0
Existing law requires the owner of a mining operation to submit
an annual report to the State Geologist and the lead agency
regarding specified matters." Chapter 845 additionally requires
6. See id. § 2728 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of lead agency). Under Chapter 845, a lead
agency may voluntarily relinquish its powers and responsibilities to the State Mining and Geology
Board, except for its authority to grant permits, if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) At least
a 45 day written notice, concerning the proposed relinquishment, is provided for the public and
mailed directly to the surface mining operators within the lead agency's jurisdiction; (2) the lead
agency's legislative body holds at least one public hearing; and (3) a majority of the lead agency's
legislative body approves the proposed relinquishment in a recorded vote. Id. § 2774.4(g) (amended
by Chapter 845).
7. 1d. § 2770(a) (amended by Chapter 845). Existing surface mining operations with vested
rights under section 2776 must submit a reclamation plan application in order to continue mining.
Id. § 2770(b) (amended by Chapter 845). See id. § 2776 (West 1984) (specifying the requirements
for an operation to acquire vested rights and stating that such operations need not obtain permits).
Lead agencies must establish procedures for the review and approval of reclamation plans and
financial assurances. Id. § 2774(a) (amended by Chapter 845). The lead agency's review is limited
to whether the plan or assurances substantially meet the requirements of sections 2772, 2773, and
2773.1, but the financial assurances must be sufficient to perform reclamation of lands remaining
disturbed. Id. § 2770(d) (amended by Chapter 845).
8. kL § 2773.1(c) (amended by Chapter 845). Cf. IOWA CODE § 83A.16 (1989) (specifying
that the previous operator's performance bond may not be released until the new operator's bond is
accepted). Under existing law, if a lead agency approved the financial assurances of an existing
surface mining operation prior to January 1, 1991, then it must review the existing financial
assurances in accordance with section 2770(d). CAL- PuB. REs. CODE § 2770(c) (amended by Chapter
845). Chapter 845 additionally provides that existing surface mining operations which have not
obtained the lead agency's approval of financial assurances by January 1, 199 1, must submit financial
assurances for review in accordance with section 2772(d). Id.
9. See id. § 2714 (a)-(d) (West 1984) (listing activities exempted under SMARA). See also
id. §§ 2710-2793 (West Supp. 1991) (specifying the provisions of SMARA).
10. Id. § 2714(e) (amended by Chapter 845).
11. See id § 2207(a)(1)-(16) (amended by Chapter 845) (specifying the date, manner, and
required content of the annual report).
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the report to indicate whether review of a reclamation plan,
fimancial assurances, or an interim management plan12 is
pending.
13
Existing law requires a lead agency to inspect surface mining
operations and notify the State Geologist regarding the mine's
compliance with SMARA. 4 Chapter 845 requires the lead agency
to also indicate whether the mining operation has a review of its




Health and Safety Code §§ 50580, 50581, 50582, 50585,
50586, 50587, 50588, 50590, 50591 (new).
SB 551 (L. Greene); 1991 STAT. Ch. 672
Existing law establishes unlawful detainer proceedings as a
judicial method of securing the eviction of a tenant for breach of
a lease or other occupancy agreement.' Chapter 672 enacts the
Transitional Housing Participant Misconduct Act (Act), under
12. See id. § 2770(h) (amended by Chapter 845) (requiring a mining operator to submit an
interim management plan within 90 days after the mine becomes idle, detailing how the operator will
maintain the site in compliance with permit conditions, among other things). See also id. § 2727.1
(West Supp. 1991) (definition of idle). Under existing law, the plan may remain in effect for up to
five years, at which time the lead agency must either renew the plan for another five year period or
require the operator to commence reclamation, but the financial assurances must remain in effect
while the operation is idle. Id. The lead agency must either approve the plan or notify the operator
of its deficiencies within 60 days, or a mutually acceptable period, after receiving it. Id.
13. Id § 2207(c) (amended by Chapter 845).
14. Id. § 2774(b) (amended by Chapter 845). The lead agency must inspect the mine within
six months after receiving the report submitted under section 2207, and thereafter not less than once
a year. Id. The lead agency must also furnish the State Geologist with a copy of the inspection form
and a statement regarding the mine's compliance with SMARA. Id
15. Id.
1. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1161-1179(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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which operators2 of transitional housing programs' may seek an
injunction prohibiting abuse4 or program misconduct' by a
participant6 in the program.7 Chapter 672 additionally permits the
court to issue an order excluding a participant from the program
site or restraining the participant from coming within 200 feet of
the program site.8 Chapter 672 permits program operators, upon
filing for an injunction, to seek a temporary restraining order
(TRO) prohibiting abuse or program misconduct by a participant.
9
2. See CAL. H-ALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50582(e) (enacted by Chapter 672) (definition of
a program operator).
3. Chapter 672 defines transitional housing programs as encompassing programs designed
to assist homeless persons in obtaining the skills necessary for independent living, if they contain
three additional components: (I) Comprehensive social service programs, including individualized
case management services; (2) use of the program unit as a temporary housing unit in a structured
living environment where occupancy is conditioned upon compliance with the unit's rules and
regulations; and (3) a rule limiting the period of occupancy to between 30 days and 24 months. Id.
§ 50582(g) (enacted by Chapter 672).
4. See id. § 50582(a) (enacted by Chapter 672) (definition of abuse).
5. See id. § 50582(d) (enacted by Chapter 672) (definition of program misconduct).
6. See id. § 50582(c) (enacted by Chapter 672) (definition of participant in a transitional
housing program).
7. Id. § 50585(a) (enacted by Chapter 672). The program operator may seek the injunction
on its own behalf, or on behalf of other participants, project employees or persons residing within
100 feet of the program site. See id. § 50582(f) (enacted by Chapter 672) (definition of program site).
Under Chapter 672, an injunction may be granted upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence
that abuse or program misconduct exists. Id. § 50585(c) (enacted by Chapter 672). The length of the
injunction may not exceed one year, but the operator may apply to renew the injunction by filing a
new petition for an injunction within three months of the expiration of the prior injunction. Id.
8. Id. § 50585(d) (enacted by Chapter 672). The exclusion order may be issued on a clear
and convincing showing of abuse of another participant, project employee or person residing within
100 feet of the project site, where great or irreparable injury would result if the order were not issued.
Id. If an exclusion order is issued under Chapter 672, the program operator may take possession of
the dwelling site, with all the rights as if it had been abandoned under section 1951.3 of the Civil
Code. Id. § 50590 (enacted by Chapter 672). If other participants, including the excluded party's
family, reside in the unit, the abandonment affects only the rights of the individual against whom the
order was issued. Id. The program operator must give the participant a reasonable time to remove the
participant's property from the unit, and thereafter, the operator may treat the property as abandoned
property pursuant to sections 1980-1990 of the Civil Code. Id. § 50591 (enacted by Chapter 672).
9. Id. § 50585(b) (enacted by Chapter 672). No TRO may be issued without notice to the
opposite party unless the affidavit shows that great or irreparable harm would result to the operator
or another participant or person residing within 100 feet of the program site before the matter could
be heard on notice. Id. A TRO may be granted upon an affidavit showing reasonable proof of abuse
or program misconduct by the participant, and that great or irreparable harm would result. Id. The
operator may not seek a TRO against any participant who has been under contract with the program
operator for at least six months, except when an action is pending against the participant or a TRO
is in effect and subject to further orders. Id. § 50585(a) (enacted by Chapter 672). A TRO may last
for a period of five days unless modified, extended or terminated by the court. Id. § 50585(b)
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Chapter 672 makes any willful disobedience of a TRO or
injunction a misdemeanor and allows a court to modify the order
thereafter to exclude the participant from the program site. 0
BAM
Property; unlawful detainer--access to records
Code of Civil Procedure § 1161.2 (new).
SB 892 (Lockyer); 1991 STAT. Ch. 1007
Existing law allows open access to public records' except
under compelling circumstances.2 Chapter 1007, relating only to
unlawful detainer3 actions, prohibits a court clerk from allowing
access to the court file, index, register of actions, or other court
records until thirty days following the date the complaint is filed
in unlawful detainer actions.4 However, the court clerk must allow
access to a party to the action, another person authorized by a
party, an occupant of the premises, or pursuant to an ex parte court
(enacted by Chapter 672). An order excluding a participant from the program site may be included
on the TRO only in emergency situations where it is necessary to protect another participant, project
employee or person residing within 100 feet of the program site from imminent serious bodily injury.
Id. § 50585(d) (enacted by Chapter 672).
10. Id. § 50585(b)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 672). Under Chapter 672, a participant who
violates a court order is considered to have failed to perform the conditions of the agreement under
which the property is held as provided in section 1161(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. Id. § 50587
(enacted by Chapter 672).
1. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1991) (definition of public records). See
also In re Hearst's Estate, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1977) (stating that
court records are "'public records" available to the public, including news reporters, unless a special
exception makes specific records nonpublic); Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol, 89 Cal. App. 3d
781, 783-85, 152 Cal. Rptr. 846, 847-49 (1979) (construing "public records" to include written
traffic accident reports prepared and retained by the California Highway Patrol).
2. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 6250-6268 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). See id. § 6253 (West Supp.
1991) (allowing public records open for inspection); § 6254 (1991) (listing particular records
exempted from public access).
3. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982) (definition of unlawful detainer).
4. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1161.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 1007).
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order upon a showing of good cause.5 Furthermore, Chapter 1007
requires the court clerk to mail notice to each defendant named in
the action, and to any named or unnamed occupant served with a
prejudgment claim of right to possession.' The notice shall contain
a statement regarding the limited access of the court file.7
WY
Property; water service--meters
Water Code §§ 110, 500, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515,
516, 520, 521, 522, 523, 530 (new).
SB 229 (Boatwright); 1991 STAT. Ch. 407
Under existing law, the installation of water meters' on all new
water service2 facilities is not required, despite the statewide policy
of water conservation? Chapter 407 requires a water purveyor4
who sells, leases, rents, furnishes, or delivers new water service to
any person,5 to condition the new water service on the installation
5. Id. Cf. id. § 116.130() (West Supp. 1991) (definition of good cause in small claims court).
See id. § 415.45 (West Supp. 1991) (governing the service of prejudgment claim of right to
possession on a named or unnamed occupant).
6. Id. § 1161.2(c) (enacted by Chapter 1007) (giving details regarding what information must
be contained in the notice).
7. Id.
1. See CAL. WATER CODE § 516 (enacted by Chapter 407) (definition of water meter).
2. See id. § 515 (enacted by Chapter 407) (definition of water service).
3. CAL. PUB. UTm. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1991). Water meters are not required unless
a public hearing is held where cost effectiveness, effectiveness in reducing water usage, and financial
burden on customers in the service area are considered. Id. See CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West
1971) (providing that the general state policy regarding water use is that waste or unreasonable use
should be prevented and that conservation should be exercised); Baldwin Park County Water District
v. Los Angeles County, 208 Cal. App. 2d 87, 97, 25 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (1962) (holding that the
Water Code shows the intention of the Legislature to adopt a general and complete scheme for the
conservation and distribution of water).
4. See CAL. WATER CODE § 512 (enacted by Chapter 407) (definition of water purveyor).
5. See id. § 513 (enacted by Chapter 407) (defining person to include any individual, firm,
association, partnership, corporation, or public entity).
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6of a water meter. Chapter 407 further provides that the cost of
installation of the water meter must be paid by the water user, and
authorizes any water purveyor to collect charges for the costs of
installation.7 Chapter 407 declares state policy regarding water
metering.8
TD III
6. Id. § 110 (enacted by Chapter 407). See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 61621.6(a) (West Supp.
1991) (providing that the Big Bear City Community Services may require as a water conservation
measure the installation of water meters to be paid for by the owners of the land where the water
meters are to be installed). Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.16(d) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-5-
70(D) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (providing that any person required to obtain a water use permit who is
unable to furnish accurate information concerning amounts of water being used, or if there is
evidence of excessive use or waste, may be required to install a water meter).
7. CAL WATER CODE § 110(a) (enacted by Chapter 407). Chapter 407 further provides that
the water meter requirement applies only to potable water. Id. § 110(c) (enacted by Chapter 407).
Under Chapter 407, single family wells, and community water systems which serve fewer than 15
service connections for yearlong residents or serve fewer than 25 yearlong residents are not required
to install water meters. Id. § 110(d) (enacted by Chapter 407).
8. Id. §§ 520-530 (enacted by Chapter 407). To prevent unreasonable use and put the
available water supply to its most beneficial use, it is necessary to determine the amount of water use
throughout the state. Id. § 520 (enacted by Chapter 407). Water used without metering has caused,
and will continue to cause, water waste that should be eliminated. Id. § 521 (enacted by Chapter
407). Because water use consumes energy, it is necessary to determine the amount of water use
throughout the state to conserve energy. Id. § 522 (enacted by Chapter 407). Chapter 407 finally
states that the goal for water metering is the installation of water meters on all new water meter
service connections after January 1, 1992. Id. § 523 (enacted by Chapter 407).
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